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1 Introduction
Consider a population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the
real line that faces a problem of location and financing of public facilities under its jurisdiction.
More specifically, a decision is to be made on the total number of facilities to be built, where
to locate them, how to assign each individual to a facility, and, finally, how to split the burden
of financing of the facilities among the residents. Every resident faces two types of costs: one is
an idiosyncratic transportation cost from their location to the chosen facility, and another is a
monetary contribution to the costs of the facility she uses.
Thus, the group solution for the locational problem described here consists of jurisdiction struc-
ture, which is a partition of individuals into jurisdictions that consist of individuals assigned to the
same facility; facility location in each jurisdiction, and sharing rule that determines individual
contributions to cover the total cost of facilities in all jurisdictions.
In this paper we focus on the search for a stable partition of the entire population into several
jurisdictions.1 In doing so, we impose the principles of efficiency and equal share. The efficiency
requires that a location of the facility in each jurisdiction is chosen in order to minimize the total
transportation cost of its residents. Since we assume that the transportation cost of each individual
is proportional to her distance from the facility location, the efficiency requirement is equivalent
to the majority voting requirement, and each jurisdiction places the facility at the location of its
median resident. As in Cremer et al. (1985), Je´hiel and Scotchmer (1997, 2001), Alesina and
Spolaore (1997), Casella (2001), Dahm et al. (2001), Haimanko et al. (2005), Bogomolnaia et al.
(2005b), we impose the assumption of equal share, where all members of the same jurisdiction make
equal contributions towards the facility cost.2
We then introduce several notions of stability that are immune to a possibility of groups of
individuals migrating to one of the existing jurisdictions or creating a new one. It is important
1Throughout the paper, we will use the terms jurisdiction structure and partition interchangeably.
2See Haeringer (2000), Le Breton and Weber (2003), Haimanko et al. (2004), Le Breton et al. (2004), Bogomolnaia
et al. (2005a) for alternative approaches to cost sharing mechanisms, and Le Breton and Weber (2004) for a general
review of cost sharing schemes in this context.
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to stress that, while migrating between jurisdictions, all individuals anticipate the median location
of the public facility and the equal share cost mechanism in a newly created jurisdiction. The
most stringent stability notion we consider is what Je´hiel and Scotchmer (2001) call admission
under unanimous consent (SAUC). This notion grants every individual the veto power regarding
a possible migration of any group of individuals from other jurisdiction to her own. Obviously, the
admission under unanimous consent severely restricts threats to stability, thus, generating a large
set of stable jurisdiction structures. We then turn to the examination of more permissive stability
threats. One is core stability (CS) or C-stable solution in Guesnerie and Oddou (1979), where every
group of individuals is allowed to leave their jurisdictions and to create a new one. Another is
stability under free mobility (SFM) that does not allow the members of an existing jurisdiction S
to prevent migration by members of other jurisdictions to S. While it is obvious that both CS
and SFM notions are stronger than SAUC, we also examine a less obvious link between CS and
SFM structures and show “almost every” SFM is also core stable. Even though there is one case,
namely, of jurisdictions represented by intervals of the same length, where this relation is reverse,
one can claim that in most of the cases the free mobility is the most permissive threat to stability.
An examination of stable partitions has to deal with the questions of number, size and com-
position of jurisdictions they contain. In characterizing the number of jurisdictions in a stable
partition one has to take into account the conflict between increasing returns to scale that favor the
creation of larger groups and the heterogeneity of individuals’ locations that support the emergence
of smaller groups. To determine the size and the composition of jurisdictions in a stable partition,
one has to take into account the fact that the presence of a sufficient number of distant individuals
in the jurisdiction may adversely impact the value of a total jurisdictional transportation cost to
the chosen facility location. From this point of view, locational heterogeneity could be costly. Note
that, for a given size of jurisdiction, the intra-heterogeneity is minimal when a jurisdiction is an
interval. In local public finance, this feature is called stratification, while in game theory it is often
called consecutiveness. Another important property of jurisdiction structures is inter-heterogeneity
of jurisdiction sizes, or so-called heterogeneity gap in sizes of jurisdictions in stable partitions. We
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show that, unlike in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Casella (2001), our stability notions may yield
a stable partition with sharply distinct jurisdiction sizes. Obviously, in the case of non-uniform
distributions (see e.g, Bogomolanaia et al. (2005b) in the finite set-up) the heterogeneity of juris-
diction sizes is a natural feature of the model. What we show is that even the uniform distribution
of individuals’ locations may yield stable structures with sharply distinct jurisdiction sizes.3
Related literature. As we indicated above, some papers in this line of research examined
various stability notions under the equal cost sharing rule and the uniform distribution of individuals
over a bounded interval (Cremer et al. (1985), Je´hiel and Scotchmer (1997, 2001), Alesina and
Spolaore (1997), Bogomolnaia et al. (2005b, 2006). Casella (2001) considered the model where
individuals are distributed along the circle, whereas Dahm et al. (2001) studied a discrete model
with equal distances between adjacent individuals. Haeringer (2000) and Le Breton and Weber
(2003, 2004), Haimanko et al. (2004) considered a more general class of cost sharing schemes.
A special attention has been paid to stability analysis under the Rawlsian principle of the utility
maximization of the most disadvantaged individual (Haeringer (2000), Le Breton at al. (2004),
Bogomolnaia et al. (2005a), Dre`ze et al. (2006). Haeringer (2001), Le Breton at al. (2003,
2004), Haimanko et al. (2004, 2005) have studied the environments with a more general class
of distribution functions and addressed the question of characterization of cost sharing rules that
admit a stable structure under various equilibrium notions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces the notions of
stability examined in this paper. In Section 3 we identify special jurisdiction structures that sat-
isfy consecutiveness, border indifference, size monotonicity and homogeneity, and examine whether
those properties are consistent with the stability notions introduced in previous section. In par-
ticular, we show that all SFM partitions are consecutive, whereas it is not necessarily the case for
SAUC and CS partitions. Section 4 contains complete characterization results for SFM partitions
and consecutive SAUC and CS partitions. More specifically, we establish bounds on the size of
3The heterogeneity of jurisdictional sizes has been examined by Je´hiel and Scotchmer (1997, 2001) who consider a
setting where a public good ir represented by a single vertical dimension (quantity), and individuals are characterized
by their willingness to pay for the public good.
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jurisdictions that yield stable partitions (under either SAUC, SFM or CS). It turns out that sta-
ble structures could display a strong size heterogeneity among jurisdictions that form it. We also
establish a somewhat surprising link between SFM and CS (while both are weaker than SAUC).
Namely, every SFM partition that contains jurisdictions of different sizes is also CS. However, the
situation is reverse for partitions that consist of equal-size intervals, where every CS partition is
SFM. Section 5 contains brief concluding remarks. The proofs of all results are relegated to the
Appendix B. This is preceded by Appendix A that contains preliminary results and remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a society which faces the problem of location, financing and assignment of its
members to public facilities (hospitals, schools, libraries, etc.). For that purpose, society may
remain as a whole or be partitioned into several jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction selects the location
for the facility (not necessarily within jurisdiction’s bounds) and finances the cost of this facility by
collecting tax from the jurisdiction members. Each individual therefore incurs two costs: the tax
(her monetary contribution towards the costs of local facility), and the transportation cost from
the individual’s own location to that of the facility. The benefit of using the service is assumed to
exceed any potential cost, and no individual would reject the usage of public facilities. This ensures
the voluntarily participation of all individuals in the process described above.
We assume that the society consists of individuals uniformly distributed over the interval I =
[0, 1]. Any measurable set S ⊂ I of a positive Lebesgue measure (not necessarily an interval!)
could be an admissible jurisdiction. We denote the measure of a jurisdiction S by |S|. We call
jurisdiction structure a partition P = {Si}1≤i≤n of I into a finite number of jurisdictions. We refer
to P with n elements as an n-partition. Slightly abusing the notation, we identify an individual
with her location, so that we will use just t for an individual located at the point t ∈ I.
The cost of a facility g > 0 is independent of location and jurisdiction and is divided equally
among jurisdiction members. The residents cover the cost of the facility so that the tax imposed
on every member of the jurisdiction S is
g
|S| . Residents of each jurisdiction face an idiosyncratic
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cost proportional to the distance to the facility chosen by that jurisdiction. We assume that the
transportation cost is linear in distance: an individual t ∈ S faces the transportation cost |t− s|, if
the facility is located at point s.
The efficiency condition implies that every jurisdiction S locates the facility at its median point
m(S), which minimizes the total transportation cost of its members (see Haimanko et al. (2004)).
If a median point is not unique (which can happen when S is not a connected set), then there is
an interval of median points and we assume that m(S) is the midpoint of this interval.
Given the assumptions above, the total cost c(t, S) of an individual t in jurisdiction S is uniquely
given by:
c(t, S) = |t−m(S)|+ g|S| .
For any jurisdiction structure P = {Si}ni=1 and any individual t ∈ I we denote by St the (unique)
jurisdiction from P which contains t. We will use the notation c(t, P ) for c(t, St), the total cost an
individual t incurs in the jurisdiction structure P .
An arbitrarily chosen partition of the society could be prone to migrations by some dissatisfied
groups (measurable sets) of individuals, who, in search for a better payoff (lower total cost) will
switch to another jurisdiction, or even to form a new jurisdiction, Our goal is to identify stable
partitions, immune to such migrations. We consider various notions of stability, steaming from
three different principles for permissible group deviations (or migrations).
The first notion allows a group of individuals S to join an existing jurisdiction T whenever all
migrants and all members of the migration target T would benefit from the migration move. This
notion of stability is called stability under admission by unanimous consent (Je´hiel and Scotchmer
(2001)):
Definition 2.1: A partition P is stable under admission by unanimous consent (SAUC) if there
exists no group S ⊂ I and a jurisdiction T ∈ P , such that c(t, S∪T ) < c(t, P ) for all t ∈ S∪T .
In particular, this implies that no set of measure zero S is allowed to move under SAUC condition.
Indeed, in this case a migration move does impact the the members of T , thus violating the strict
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inequality in the definition. Thus, only a group of a positive measure could present a migration
threat under SAUC.
The second notion of stability emerges when a group of individuals (from possibly different
jurisdictions) is allowed to form a new jurisdiction. This leads to the traditional core stability (CS)
notion which was called C-stable solution in Guesnerie and Oddou (1979):
Definition 2.2: A partition P is called core stable (CS) if there exists no group S ⊂ I such that
c(t, S) < c(t, P ) for every t ∈ S.
Since an admissible under SAUC migration is also an admissible deviation under CS, SAUC is a
weaker requirement then CS.
The third possibility is to allow a group of individuals S to join a jurisdiction T . It requires
that only members of S are better off, without demanding an improvement for members of T . The
corresponding notion of stability is called stability under free mobility (SFM).
Definition 2.3: A partition P is stable under free mobility (SFM) if there exists no group S ∈ I,
together with a jurisdiction T ∈ P , such that c(t, S ∪ T ) < c(t, P ) for all t ∈ S.
Since SFM does not demand the consent of the members of the host jurisdiction, SAUC is weaker
than SFM as well. The relation between SFM and CS is less obvious.4 Contrary to the CS
requirement, under SFM, potential migrants have to join an existing jurisdiction and they are not
allowed to form a new one. Nevertheless we will show that, except for the special case of partitions
that consist of equal intervals, CS is implied by SFM. Thus, CS requirement is “generically” weaker
then SFM. Even more surprisingly, in the homogenous case, the situation reverses and SFM is
implied by CS.
To summarize the type of admissible deviations, under all three stability notions, a necessary
condition for a group S to consider a migration is the strict reduction of the after-migration relative
to the pre-migration costs for all members of S. Moreover,
4Note that, unlike in SAUC, both CS and SFM allow for migrant sets of measure zero.
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• Under SAUC, a deviating group S should join an existing jurisdiction T and make all members
of T better off;
• Under CS, a deviating group S should form its own new jurisdiction;
• Under SFM, a deviating group S should join an existing jurisdiction, but there is no require-
ment of a cost reduction for the members of the host jurisdiction.
We now turn to identification of special classes of jurisdiction partitions and their compatibility
with stability notions defined in this section.
3 Classes of partitions
So far we have not imposed any ex ante restrictions on the set of admissible partitions or
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, some special types of partitions play important role in potential ap-
plications, and will be of particular interest to our analysis. We then investigate a possibility
that the restrictions on partitions we impose are consistent with the stability notions we exam-
ine. The most important type of partitions consisting of consecutive (see Greenberg and Weber
(1986)) jurisdictions, which are represented by intervals in I (which may or may not contain their
endpoints):
Definition 3.1: A partition P of I is consecutive if every S ∈ P is an interval.
A consecutive partition P can be given by the sequence of intervals {(xi−1, xi)}1≤i≤n, where 0 =
x0 < x1 < . . . xn−1 < xn = 1. We will denote the length of an interval Si = (xi−1, xi) in P
by si. Given that x0 = 0 and xn = 1, a consecutive partition is uniquely defined by the n − 1-
tuple (x1, . . . , xn−1), where 0 < x1 < . . . xn−1 < 1 or by positive numbers s1, . . . , sn, such that∑n
i=1 si = 1. If no confusion will arise, we use the notation P = (x1, . . . , xn−1) or P = (s1, . . . , sn).
An important property of a consecutive partition P is that a peripheral individual, located on the
border of two adjacent intervals in P , namely at points x1, . . . , xn−1, will be indifferent between
locating being in any of these two jurisdictions. Obviously, this property would be important for
the analysis of a potential migration of “almost peripheral” individuals close to the border with
other jurisdictions. We will refer to this property as the border indifference:
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Definition 3.2: A consecutive partition P = (x1, . . . , xn−1) satisfies border indifference (BI) if for
all i = 1, . . . , n− 1 we have c(xi, [xi−1, xi]) = c(xi, [xi, xi+1]).
Note that a partition P satisfies BI if and only if the function c(·, P ) is continuous on I.
We will also consider a subset of consecutive partitions in which the sequence of jurisdiction
sizes is monotone from one endpoint of I to another:
Definition 3.3: A consecutive partition P of I is size-monotone if either s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sn or
s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn. (Without loss of generality, we will conduct our analysis for the former
case).
If the inequality in Definition 3.3 turns into equality, the partitions with equal-size jurisdictions
will arise:
Definition 3.4: A size-monotone partition P of I is homogenous if s1 = . . . = sn. A non-
homogeneous partition (not necessarily size-monotone) will be referred to as a heterogenous
partition.
We now establish the link between properties of partitions introduced in this section and our
stability notions. First,
Proposition 3.5: Any SFM partition is consecutive.
However, this conclusion does not hold for other two stability notions we consider. Moreover, even
a consecutive CS (and SAUC) partition may not size-monotone (and thus, not homogeneous):
Proposition 3.6: (i) A CS (and hence a SAUC) partition is not necessarily consecutive.
(ii) A consecutive CS partition is not necessarily size-monotone.
In the next section we provide the characterization results for stable partitions.
4 Stable Partitions: Characterization Results
Before proceeding with the characterization of stable consecutive partitions, it would be useful
to have a more detailed examination of a monetary cost incurred by members of a jurisdiction in
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the partition. Indeed consider an interval S = [a, b] of length s = b−a and note that the peripheral
individuals a and b incur the highest total cost within the jurisdiction.5 Their total burden is given
by the value of the “peripheral” cost function Ψ defined on <+:
Ψ(s) =
s
2
+
g
s
.
It is easy to see that Ψ is strictly convex, attains its minimum at d∗(g) =
√
2g, and min
s≥0
Ψ(s) =
Ψ(d∗(g)) = d∗(g). Moreover, it decreases for s < d∗(g), increases for s > d∗(g), and attains any
value d > d∗(g) twice (once at some s < d∗(g), and once at some s′ > d∗(g)). Thus, s = d∗(g)
is the “optimal size” of an interval jurisdiction that minimizes the cost of the most disadvantaged
individuals. Note also that the border indifference condition BI can be presented as Ψ(s1) = . . . =
Ψ(sn). Hence, any partition which satisfies BI contains jurisdictions of at most two distinct sizes.
We now provide the complete characterization of SFM partitions. In the multi-jurisdictional
case we determine the bounds for jurisdictional sizes in a SFM partition:
Proposition 4.1: (i) A consecutive heterogeneous partition P into multiple jurisdictions is SFM
if and only if it satisfies BI, and for each S ∈ P we have |S| ∈
[
d∗(g)√
2
,
√
2d∗(g)
]
;
(ii) A homogenous partition P into multiple interval jurisdictions of size s is SFM if and only
if s ≥ d
∗(g)√
2
;
(iii) The grand jurisdiction I is always SFM.
Given the fact that a heterogenous partition under BI can contain jurisdictions of different sizes,
in order to verify whether this partition is SFM, one has to check whether the jurisdictions are
neither too small nor too large. In the homogenous case the verification of only one bound would
suffice.
It is worthwhile to establish the link between SFM and CS (to recall both notions are weaker
than SAUC). It turns out that, in heterogenous case, SFM is weaker than CS. Even more surprising
5In the case of closed intervals, two jurisdictions have a common peripheral individual, that could be considered to
be a member of both, whereas in the case of open intervals there could be an individual that belongs to no jurisdiction.
We discuss this technical point in the Appendix A.
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is the fact that the inclusion is reverse in the homogenous case, where the set of CS partitions is a
subset of the SFM set:
Proposition 4.2: (i) Every heterogenous SFM partition is CS.
(ii) Every consecutive homogenous CS partition is SFM.
We now turn to the examination of SAUC and CS partitions. Even though Proposition 3.6
indicates that SAUC and CS partitions could be non-consecutive, in what follows we concentrate
on the case when only admissible jurisdictions are intervals. Proposition 3.6 also implies if a CS
(SAUC) partition is consecutive, it need not be size-monotone. However, once size-monotonicity is
imposed,6 we obtain sufficient conditions for SAUC and CS:
Proposition 4.3: Let P = (s1, . . . , sn) be a size-monotone partition of I where d∗(g) ≤ s1. Then
P satisfies BI and is SAUC.
Proposition 4.4: Let P = (s1, . . . , sn) be a size-monotone partition of I where d∗(g) ≤ s1 ≤ . . . ≤
sn ≤
√
2d∗(g). Then P satisfies BI and is CS.
To guarantee that a size-monotone partition is SAUC, it is enough to verify that jurisdictions in
this partition are not too small: the smallest jurisdiction should not be smaller then the “optimal”
size d∗(g). If we wish to impose a stricter requirement of CS, we also have to limit the size of
jurisdictions from above so that the size of the largest jurisdiction does not exceed
√
2d(g). These
sufficient conditions allow a wide range of stable structures.
If we further restrict our attention to homogenous partitions, we obtain a necessary and sufficient
condition for CS:
Proposition 4.5: (i) A homogenous partition of I which consists of multiple jurisdictions of size
s (and therefore, satisfies BI) is CS if and only if
d∗(g)√
2
≤ s ≤ d∗(g)
(
1 +
√
2
)
.
(ii) The interval I is CS if and only if
√
g ≥ 1
2 +
√
6
.7
6To recall, we restrict our examination to the case s1 ≤ . . . ≤ sn.
7Note that this condition also gives a necessary and sufficient conditions for (core) stability of a given jurisdiction
Si ∈ P against internal threats, i.e., against potentially seceding jurisdictions S ⊂ Si.
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Since s = 1n and d
∗(g) =
√
2g, last proposition allows us to determine the values of n, which,
for given g > 0, admit CS n-partitions. Namely,
if
√
g ≥ 1
2 +
√
6
, then 1-partition is CS;
if
√
g ≤ 1
n
≤ √g
(
2 +
√
2
)
, where n > 1, then there exists a CS n-partition.
We also provide an alternative version (actually a corollary) of Proposition 4.5 by identifying,
for given n, the range of values of g that yield a homogenous CS n-partition.
Proposition 4.6: (i) A multi-jurisdictional homogenous n-partition is CS if and only if
1
n2[2 +
√
2]2
≤ g ≤ 1
n2
.
(ii) A homogenous CS partition exists for any g > 0.
5 Brief Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examined a population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly
distributed over the unit interval that faces a problem of location and financing of public facilities.
Under the assumption of equal share, we consider various notions of stability of jurisdiction struc-
tures (stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core) and provide a characterization of
stable structures.
This leaves a room for extensions of those results. One can consider a more general type
of distribution function alternative (e.g., monotone density functions in Haeringer (2001), log-
concave distributions (Haimanko et al. (2005), the general case in Haimanko et al. (2004)). Even
more challenging and open area of research is a possible extension of the set of feasible locations
to a multidimensional setting. Indeed, a multidimensional set of alternatives is an appropriate
framework for a large array of applications in economics, political science or geography, where
preferences or locations of an individual are characterized by more than one parameter. We hope
that a progress can be achieved along this line of research.
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6 Appendix A - Preliminary Results
We start by introducing some notation. For every jurisdiction S (either a member of an initial
jurisdiction structure, or a potentially deviating group), denote by l(S) = inf{t|t ∈ S} and r(S) =
sup{t|t ∈ S} its peripheral individuals. We will assume for every S both l(S) and r(S) belong to
S. Thus, if two jurisdictions have a common peripheral individual, she is considered a member of
both. We will ignore a finite number of such individuals (at most n as the number of jurisdictions
in the partition).8
We will use the notation c(t, S) even if an individual t does not belong to S. In this case, c(t, S)
stands for the total cost c(t, S∪{t}) an individual t would incur if she joins jurisdiction S. Note that,
given S, c(t, S) = c(t, S ∪ {t}) = |t −m(S)| + g|S| is a continuous single-dipped function. For any
partition P , any group S, and any individual t ∈ I, we define ∆(t, S, P ) = c(t, S)− c(t, P ). Recall
that, whenever a group S is allowed to deviate (under either SAUC, CS or SFM), all members of S
must be strictly better off relatively to their cost levels in the original partition P . Hence, S would
deviate only if ∆(t, S, P ) < 0 for all t ∈ S.
Let g > 0 be given and we will use the notation d∗ instead of d∗(g) for the optimal size of
jurisdiction given. We need the following remarks and lemmas.
Remark A.1 The peripheral cost function Ψ(s) =
s
2
+
g
s
, defined in Section 4, satisfies the
following conditions:
dΨ(s)
ds
∈
[
−1
2
,
1
2
]
for s ∈ [√g,+∞).
Ψ(s+ a) > Ψ(s)− |a|
2
for s ∈ [√g,+∞) and a > −s.
This follows from direct differentiation and the fact that the convexity of Ψ implies Ψ(s + a) >
Ψ(s) + Ψ′(s)a.
Remark A.2. If P is SAUC, then for any Si, Sj ∈ P , i 6= j we have m(Si) 6= m(Sj).
The proof is straightforward.
8All the statements in the paper remain true without this assumption, but its absence would make the presentation
unnecessarily burdened by technical details. The proofs in absence of this assumption are available from authors upon
request.
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Remark A.3. For any S we have min{c(l(S), S), c(r(S), S)} ≥ Ψ(|S|) ≥ d∗ and
max{c(l(S), S), c(r(S), S)} = max{c(t, S) : t ∈ S} ≥ Ψ(|r(S)− l(S)|).
All inequalities are straightforward except the last one. Assume c(l(S), S) ≥ c(r(S), S). Then
m(S) ≥ m([l(S), r(S)]), and
c(l(S), S) = |l(S)−m(S)|+ g|S| ≥ |l(S)−m([l(S), r(S)])|+
g
|r(S)− l(S)| = Ψ(|r(S)− l(S)|).
Remark A.4. If t is a peripheral individual in S, then c(t, S) ≥ min
s
Ψ(s) = d∗ =
√
2g > 1.4
√
g.
If S is a group that violates SAUC of the jurisdiction structure P , then c(t, P ) > d∗, and hence
|St| 6= d∗.
Remark A.5. Let P = (s1, . . . , sn) be a consecutive partition, with si ∈ [√g, 2√g]. Then for
any t ∈ I we have
c(t, P ) ≤ max
1≤i≤n
{Ψ(si)} ≤ max {Ψ(s) : s ∈ [√g, 2√g]} = Ψ(√g) = Ψ(2√g) = 1.5√g.
Lemma A.6. Let P = (x1, . . . , xn−1) be a consecutive partition, with si ∈ [√g, 2√g]. If a
group S violates CS of P , then there exist i, j such that max{|l(S)− xi|, |r(S)− xj |} < 0.1√g.
Proof: We can assume l(S) ∈ Si = [xi−1, xi] ∈ P and l(S) ≥ m(Si). Then:
c(xi, Si)− c(l(S), P ) = c(xi, Si)− c(l(S), Si) = |xi −m(Si)| − |l(S)−m(Si)| = |l(S)− xi|.
Then Remarks A.5 and A.4 and the fact that S violates CS of P yield
1.4
√
g ≤ c(l(S), S) < c(l(S), P ) ≤ 1.5√g − |l(S)− xi|
, and, hence, |l(S)−xi| < 0.1√g. Since the similar argument works for an evaluation of the distance
|r(S)− xj |, the conclusion follows. 2
Lemma A.7. Let P be a consecutive partition, satisfying BI. Then for every jurisdiction S,
the function ∆(·, S, P ) is a continuous (in fact, a peace-wise linear) function on I, single-dipped,
and attains its minimum at m(S).
Proof: Continuity follows from BI. For t ≤ m(S) we have
∆(t, S, P ) = c(t, S)− c(t, P ) = |t−m(S)| − |t−m(St)|+ g|S| −
g
|St|
= m(S)− t− |t−m(St)|+ C1(St) =
{
C2(St), t ≤ m (Si);
C2(St)− 2t, t ≥ m (Si).
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Here C1(St), C2(St) are constant on each St. Hence, ∆(t, S, P ) is (non-strictly) decreasing on each
interval St∩ [0,m(S)]. Thus, it is decreasing on [0,m(S)]. Analogously, it is increasing on [m(S), 1].
2
Lemma A.8. Let P be a consecutive partition, satisfying BI. If no interval can violate CS of
P , then P is CS.
Proof Assume that S violate CS of P by deviating from P and making all its members better
off. Then ∆(l(S), S, P ) < 0 and ∆(r(S), S, P ) < 0, and, hence, by Lemma A.7, ∆(t, S, P ) < 0 on
the entire interval [l(S), r(S)]. But then the interval [m(S)− |S|2 ,m(S) + |S|2 ] can also make all its
members better off, a contradiction. 2
We now turn to the proof of our main results.
7 Appendix B - Main Results
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Assume to the contrary, that P is SFM but is not consecutive.
Then there are two different jurisdictions S, S′ ∈ P and individuals t1, t2 ∈ S, t′ ∈ S′, such that
t1 < t
′ < t2. Without loss of generality, we can assume m(S) < m(S′) (see Remark A.2). We have
for all t ∈ I:
c(t, S)− c(t, S′) = |t−m(S)| − |t−m(S′)|+ g|S| −
g
|S′|
= |t−m(S)| − |t−m(S′)|+ C =

m(S)−m(S′) + C, t ≤ m(S);
2t−m(S)−m(S′) + C, m(S) ≤ t ≤ m(S′);
m(S′)−m(S) + C, m(S′) ≤ t.
Hence, c(t, S)− c(t, S′) is an increasing function of t on [0, 1], and so c(t1, S)− c(t1, S′) < c(t′, S)−
c(t′, S′) < c(t2, S) − c(t2, S′). But SFM implies that no individual can improve her fate by
changing jurisdiction. In particular, we should have c(t1, S) ≤ c(t1, S′), c(t2, S) ≤ c(t2, S′), and
c(t′, S′) ≤ c(t′, S), which contradicts the above inequalities. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.6. (i) Let g = 118 and therefore d
∗ = 13 . Consider P that consists
of three jurisdictions, S1 = [0, d∗ − ε]
⋃
[1− ε, 1], S2 = (d∗ − ε, 2d∗ − ε), S3 = (2d∗ − ε, 1− ε).
Assume, in negation that a jurisdiction S can deviate from P and to violate CS of P . By Remark
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A.4, neither l(S) nor r(S) can belong to either S2, S3 or [0, d− ε], since any individual t located in
one of those areas has c(t, P ) ≤ d. Hence, S ⊂ [1− ε, 1] ⊂ S1.
Note that for any t ∈ I we have c(t, P ) = |t −m(St)| + g
d∗
≤ 1 + g
d∗
=
7
6
. So, if S deviates, it
has to be c(t, S) < c(t, P ) ≤ 7
6
for all t ∈ S. But, for ε small enough, c(t, S) ≥ g|S| =
1
18ε
≥ 7
6
, a
contradiction.
(ii) Let g = 118 and d
∗ =
√
2
6 . Consider a consecutive 4-partition P = (s1, s2, s3, s4), where
s1 = s4 = 16 and s2 = s3 =
1
3 . By Proposition 4.1, part (i), it is SFM, and by Proposition 4.2, part
(i), it is CS, too. However, P is obviously not size-monotone. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (i)“Only if” part. Let P = {S1, . . . , Sn} = (x1, . . . , xn−1) =
(s1, . . . , sn) be a consecutive heterogeneous SFM n-partition, n > 1.
Assume that BI condition does not hold. Then, without loss of generality, there exists an
individual xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, peripheral for Si and Si+1, such that c(xi, Si) > c(xi, Si+1). But
then for any small enough positive ε we have c(xi−ε, Si) > c(xi−ε, Si+1), so the interval (xi−ε, xi)
would benefit from migrating to Si+1, which contradicts SFM.
Now, since P satisfies BI and is heterogeneous, it contains jurisdictions of exactly two sizes, s′
and s′′, where s′ < s′′ and Ψ(s′) = Ψ(s′′). To complete this part, it is enough to check that s′ ≥ √g
(since Ψ(
√
g) = Ψ(2
√
g), s′′ ≤ 2√g follows).
Assume to the contrary that s′ < √g. Then we have s′′ > 2√g > 2s′ and s′ < g
s′
. We can
assume without loss of generality that S1 = [0, s′] and S2 = [s′, s′ + s′′]. We check that the group
T = [s′′−ε, s′+s′′] ⊂ S2 would benefit from joining S1 = [0, s′], for ε such that 0 < ε < (s′′−2s′)/2
and ε < Ψ(s′′)−Ψ(2s′ + ε) (such ε > 0 exists, since Ψ(s′′) > Ψ(2s′) and Ψ is continuous).
First, note that |T | = s′ + ε > s′, so m(T ∪ S1) ∈ T ; moreover, m(T ∪ S1) = s′′ − ε2 > s
′′ − ε >
m(S2) = s′ +
s′′
2
. We will now check that ∆(t, T ∪ S1, P ) = c(t, T ∪ S1)− c(t, P ) < 0 for all t ∈ T .
First,
∆(s′ + s′′, T ∪ S1, P ) = c(s′ + s′′, T ∪ S1)− c(s′ + s′′, P ) = Ψ(2s′ + ε)−Ψ(s′′) < −ε < 0.
16
Next, for t ∈ T with m(S2) < m(T ∪ S1) = s′′ − ε2 ≤ t ≤ s
′ + s′′, we have
∆(t, T ∪ S1, P ) = c(t, T ∪ S1)− c(t, P ) = ∆(s′ + s′′, T ∪ S1, P ) = Ψ(2s′ + ε)−Ψ(s′′) < −ε < 0.
Finally, for t ∈ T with m(S2) < s′′ − ε ≤ t ≤ s′′ − ε2 = m(T ∪ S1), we have
∆(t, T ∪ S1, P ) = ∆(s′ + s′′, T ∪ S1, P ) + 2(m(T ∪ S1)− t) =
Ψ(2s′ + ε)−Ψ(s′′) + (2s′′ − ε− 2t) < 2(s′′ − ε− t) ≤ 0.
Thus, T would benefit from deviation, which contradicts SFM. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (ii). “Only if” part. Let P be a homogenous partition into
intervals of size s. If s <
√
g, then s <
g
s
, and a jurisdiction S1 = [0, s] would benefit from joining
S2 = [s, 2s]. Indeed, for any t ∈ S1 we have
c(t, S1) = |t− s2 |+
g
s
≥ |t− s| − |s
2
− s|+ g
s
= |t− s|+ g
s
− s
2
> |t− s|+ g
2s
= c(t, S1 ∪ S2).
Note that in this case all members of S1 ∪ S2 benefit form joining together. Thus, for s < √g
partition P is neither SFM nor CS. 2
We will use Proposition 4.2 to prove the “if” part of Proposition 4.1 (i) and (ii), so we prove
Proposition 4.2 before completing the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. part (i) The “only if” part of Proposition 4.1 (i) implies that if
a heterogeneous P is SFM then it satisfies BI and consists of intervals of two different sizes, s′ and
s′′, where √g ≤ s < s′′ ≤ 2√g and Ψ(s′) = Ψ(s′′) = ψ ≤ 1.5√g. Proposition 4.2 follows from the
following stronger statement:
Proposition B.1: If a consecutive partition P satisfies BI and
√
g ≤ |Si| ≤ 2√g for all jurisdictions
Si ∈ P , then P is CS.
Proof: If P satisfies the conditions of Proposition B.1, then it satisfies BI and hence consists of
intervals of at most two sizes, s′ and s′′, where √g ≤ s′ ≤ s′′ ≤ 2√g and Ψ(s′) = Ψ(s′′) = ψ ≤
1.5
√
g.
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Hence, by Remark A.5, we have c(t, P ) ≤ 1.5√g for any t ∈ P . If a jurisdiction S can deviate
under CS, then, by Lemma A.8, we may assume it is an interval. Let p be a peripheral individual
in S. Then Remark A.3 yields Ψ(|S|) ≤ c(p, S) < c(p, P ) ≤ 1.5√g, and, therefore, |S| ∈ (√g, 2√g).
By Lemma A.6 we can find xi and xj , peripheral individuals in jurisdictions in P , such that
that both differences a1 = |l(S)− xi| and a2 = |r(S)− xj | are smaller than 0.1√g. Without loss of
generality, assume that a1 ≥ a2. We have S = [l(S), r(S)] = [xi ± a1, xj ± a2] and i ≤ j. We now
consider the following four possible cases.
CASE 1: i = j. Here |S| = r(S) − l(S) ≤ |l(S) − xi| + |r(S) − xi| ≤ 0.2√g, which contradicts
the assumption that |S| > √g.
CASE 2: i = j − 1, so [xj−1, xj ] = Sj ∈ P . Then, given a1 ≥ a2, and Remark A.1, we have:
c(l(S), S) = Ψ(|S|) = Ψ(sj ± a1 ± a2) > Ψ(sj)− | ± a1 ± a2|2 ≥ ψ − |a1| = c(l(S), P ),
a contradiction to S being a deviating group.
CASE 3: i = j − 2. Then, since Ψ is increasing on [√2g,+∞), we have:
c(l(S), S) = Ψ(|S|) = Ψ(sj + sj−1 ± a1 ± a2) > Ψ(sj + sj−1)− | ± a1 ± a2|2 ≥
Ψ(2
√
g)− |a1| = 1.5√g − |a1| ≥ ψ − |a1| = c(l(S), P ),
a contradiction again. Finally,
CASE 4: j − i ≥ 3. Then, |S| ≥ 3√g − 0.2√g = 2.8√g > 2√g, a contradiction again. This
completes the proof of both Proposition B.1 and part (i) of Proposition 4.2. Part (ii) of the latter
proposition follows immediately from Proposition 4.5. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (i). “If” part. Again, we will prove a bit stronger statement,
namely:
Proposition B.2: If a consecutive partition P satisfies BI and
√
g ≤ |Si| ≤ 2√g for all jurisdictions
Si ∈ P , then P is SFM.
Proof: Consider a consecutive P , which satisfies BI and hence consists of intervals of at most two
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sizes, s′ and s′′, where by the assumption √g ≤ s′ ≤ s′′ ≤ 2√g and so Ψ(s′) = Ψ(s′′) = ψ ≤ 1.5√g.
Proposition B.1 guarantees that P is CS.
Assume that P is not SFM. Hence, there exists a group T , and a jurisdiction Si ∈ P such that
all members of T prefer T ∪ Si to T . We can choose T so that T ∩ Si = ∅. We partition T into Tl
and Tr, which lie respectively to the left and to the right of Si = [xi−1, xi]: we have t ≤ xi−1 for all
t ∈ Tl, and t ≥ xi for all t ∈ Tr.
First, one of Tl and Tr should be empty. Indeed, let T ′ = T ∪ Si with l(T ′) ∈ Tl, r(T ′) ∈
Tr. Since both values ∆(l(T ′), T ′, P ) and ∆(r(T ′), T ′, P ) are negative, Lemma A.7 implies that
∆(t, T ′, P ) < 0 for all t ∈ [l(T ′), r(T ′)]. But this means that the group T ′ can deviate by forming
its own jurisdiction, a contradiction to the fact that P is CS.
Now, without loss of generality, assume Tr = ∅ and T = Tl, T ′ = [l(T ′), xi]. By Remark A.5 we
have 1.5
√
g ≥ c(l(S), P ) > c(l(S), T ′) ≥ Ψ(|T ′|), and so |T ′| < 2√g. Since |Si| ≥ √g, we obtain
|T | < √g and so m(T ′) ∈ Si.
Next, note that that the individual located at m(T ′) is better off at T ′ than at Si: her tax
contribution declines since jurisdiction becomes larger, and her transportation cost drops to zero.
Thus, ∆(l(T ′), T ′, P ) < 0, ∆(m(T ′), T ′, P ) < 0, and Lemma A.7 implies that ∆(t, T ′, P ) < 0
for all t ∈ [l(T ′),m(T ′)]. It tells us that the interval T ′′ = [xi−1 − |T |, xi−1] = [p, xi−1], with
|T ′′| = |T | < √g, also can deviate under SFM by joining the adjacent interval Si.
If |Si| = s′′, then c(p, Si ∪ T ′′) = Ψ(|Si ∪ T ′′|) > Ψ(s′′) = Ψ(s′) ≥ c(l(S), P ), which contradicts
the assumption that T ′′ can deviate under SFM. Hence, |Si| = s′.
Furthermore, we have |T ′′| < √g, and its left endpoint belongs to Si−1. From Remark A.1 we
obtain: if p ≥ m(Si−1), then
c(p, T ′′ ∪ Si) = Ψ
(|T ′′ ∪ Si|) = Ψ(s′ + |T ′′|) > Ψ(s′)− |T ′′| = ψ − |T ′′| = c(p, Si−1) = c(p, P );
if p ≤ m(Si−1), then also
c(p, T ′′ ∪ Si) = Ψ
(|T ′′ ∪ Si|) = Ψ(s′ + si−1 − (si−1 − |T |)) > Ψ(s′ + si−1)− (si−1 − |T |)
Ψ(2
√
g)− (si−1 − |T |) = ψ − (si−1 − |T |) = c(p, Si−1) = c(p, P ).
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Hence, both possibilities contradict the assumption that T ′′ can deviate by joining Si under SFM.
This completes the proof of both Proposition B.2 and Proposition 4.1 (i). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (ii). “If” part. Let P be a homogenous partition into intervals
of size s ≥ √g. If √g ≤ s ≤ √2g, then SFM follows from Proposition B.2 above. Let s ≥ √2g.
Suppose that a group T contemplates joining a jurisdiction Si = [(i−1)s, is] ∈ P . By Remark A.1,
we have:
c(l(S), T ∪ Si) ≥ Ψ(|T ∪ Si|) ≥ Ψ(s) ≥ c(l(S), P ),
and the individual at l(S) would not benefit from this migration. Thus, there are no profitable
migrations, and P is SFM. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let P = {S1, . . . , Sn} = (s1, . . . , sn) be a size-monotone partition,
with d =
√
2g ≤ s1 ≤ . . . ≤ sn. If it is not SAUC, then there exists T ⊂ I and Si ∈ P , such that
S = T ∪ Si is preferred to P by all its members.
Let S be such that l(S) ∈ Sj ∈ P , j ≤ i. Using Remarks A.1 and A.3, we obtain c(l(S), P ) =
c(l(S), Sj) ≤ Ψ(sj) ≤ Ψ(si) < Ψ(|S|) ≤ c(l(S), S), a contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Let P = {S1, . . . , Sn} = (s1, . . . , sn) = (x1, . . . , xn−1) be a size-
monotone partition, with d =
√
2g ≤ s1 ≤ . . . ≤ sn ≤ 2√g. By Remark A.5, c(t, P ) ≤ 1.5√g for
all t ∈ I. If P is not CS, then there exists a group T ⊂ I which would be better of by forming its
own jurisdiction. By Lemma A.6, there exist i and j, such that both differences a1 = |l(S) − xi|
and a2 = |r(S)− xj | are smaller than 0.1√g.
Since sk ≥
√
2g for all Sk ∈ P , we have i ≤ j.
If i = j, we get |T | < 0.2√g and c(l(S), T ) ≥ g|T | > 1.5
√
g ≥ c(l(S), P ).
If i < j − 1, we get |T | > 1.8√2g and c(l(S), T ) > Ψ(1.8√2g) > 1.5√g ≥ c(l(S), P ).
Both cases contradict the fact that T can beneficially deviate under CS, hence, i = j − 1.
This means that the individuals xi = xj−1 and xj are peripheral in Sj ∈ P . Thus, r(S) − l(S) ≥
20
sj − 0.2√g ≥
√
2g − 0.2√g = (√2− 0.2)√g.
Consider two possible cases:
CASE 1: |T | < |Sj | = sj . Then c(m(Sj), P ) < c(m(Sj), T ) (the contribution of m(Sj) is larger
in T , while her transportation cost is smaller (zero) at P ), hence m(Sj) 6∈ T . For the same reason,
the individuals from the half of Sj between m(Sj) and its peripheral individual, which does not
containm(T ) in its interior, cannot belong to T . This observation yields |T | ≤ sj
2
+0.2
√
g ≤ 1.2√g.
Moreover,
max{c(l(S), T ), c(r(S), T )} ≥ |r(S)− l(S)|
2
+
g
|T | ≥
1
2
(sj − 0.2√g) + gsj
2
+ 0.2
√
g
=
(sj
4
− 0.2√g
)
+
1
2
(sj
2
+ 0.2
√
g
)
+
g
sj
2
+ 0.2
√
g
=
(sj
4
− 0.2√g
)
+Ψ
(sj
2
+ 0.2
√
g
)
.
Since
√
2g ≤ sj ≤ 2√g, we have sj2 + 0.2
√
g ≤ 1.2√g < d∗, and, given that Ψ decreases on [0, d∗],
we obtain Ψ
(sj
2
+ 0.2
√
g
)
≥ Ψ(1.2√g). Thus, we can continue:
max{c(l(S), T ), c(r(S), T )} ≥
(√
2g
4 − 0.2
√
g
)
+Ψ(1.2
√
g) =
(√
2
4 − 0.2
)√
g + 0.6
√
g + 11.2
√
g
=
(√
2
4 + 0.4 +
5
6
)√
g = 15
√
2+74
60
√
g > 1.5
√
g = max
t∈I
c(t, P ).
This contradicts the fact that l(S) joins the deviating group T .
CASE 2: |T | ≥ |Sj | = sj . Since |l(S) − xj−1| ≤ 0.1√g, we have l(S) ∈ Sj or l(S) ∈ Sj−1, so
√
2g ≤ |Sl(S)| ≤ |T |. Hence, c(l(S), T ) ≥ Ψ(|T |) ≥ Ψ(Sl(S)) = c(l(S), Sl(S)) = c(l(S), P ), so the
individual l(S) does not improve from P to T . This contradiction proves our proposition. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Since any homogenous consecutive partition satisfies BI, Lemma
A.8 applies, so P is CS if no interval can deviate.
Part (i), n > 1; “only if”. We have already checked (see the proof of Proposition 4.1 (ii),
“only if” part), that for s <
√
g our partition will not be CS.
If s > (2 +
√
2)
√
g, then T =
[
x1 −
√
g
2 , x1 +
√
g
2
]
, the interval of the size
√
g centered in one
of the peripheral points of P would benefit from deviation. Indeed, among the members of T , the
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individual x1 −
√
g
2 has the largest cost in T and the smallest cost in P , but still
c(x1 −
√
g
2
, P ) = Ψ(s)−
√
g
2
>
1 +
√
2
2
√
g +
√
g
2 +
√
2
= 1.5
√
g = c(x1 −
√
g
2
).
Part (i), n > 1; “if”. If s ∈ [√g, 2√g] then Proposition B.1 (utilized in the proof of Proposition
4.2 above) guarantees that P is CS. Let s ∈ (2√g, [2 +√2]√g], so that 1.5 ≤ Ψ(s) ≤ 2√g, and let
T = [l(S), r(S)] be a deviating interval.
Similarly to Lemma A.6, there exist peripheral (relative to jurisdictions in P ) individuals xi
and xj , such that |l(S) − xi|, |r(S) − xj | < 0.6√g. Indeed, without loss of generality assume
l(S) ∈ Si = [xi−1, xi] ∈ P , l(S) ≥ m(Si). Then: |l(S) − xi| = c(xi, Si) − c(l(S), Si) = Ψ(s) −
c(l(S), P ) < 2
√
g − 1.4√g = 0.6√g.
Now, since 2
√
g ≤ s, we have i ≥ j.
If i = j, then assume l(S) ∈ Si (if not, then r(S) ∈ Si+1 and we do the same argument for
c(r(S), Si+1) ). We then obtain the following contradiction with T deviating profitably:
c(l(S), Si) = Ψ(s)− |xi − pi| < Ψ(s)− 0.6√g ≤ 1.4√g = 4230
√
g,
c(l(S), T ) ≥ Ψ(|T |) ≥ Ψ(1.2√g) = 4330
√
g.
If i < j, then we can assume without loss of generality that a1 = |l(S) − xi| ≥ a2 = |r(S) − xj |.
Using Remark A.1, we again obtain a contradiction with T profitably deviating:
c(l(S), T ) = Ψ(|T |) = Ψ((j − i)s± a1 ± a2) > Ψ(s)− | ± a1 ± a2|2 ≥ Ψ(s)− |a1| = c(l(S), P ).
This completes the proof of part (i).
Part (ii), n = 1. Let P = {I}, and suppose that all members of T = [l(S), r(S)] benefit from
the deviation by T . Without loss of generality, let m(T ) < m(I) = 12 . If r(S) ≥ 12 , then individual
r(S) would be worse off at T than at I (indeed, both monetary and transportation cost would
increase). Hence, r(S) < 12 .
Denote p = r(S) − l(S). We claim that T ′ = [0, p] also can deviate under CS. Indeed, for
every individual t ∈ T ′ we have c(t, T ′) = c(t + l(S), T ) < c(t + l(S), I) ≤ c(t, I). Next, if
T ′ = [0, p], where p < 12 , can deviate under CS, then (since members of T
′ contribute at least 2g)
2g < c(t, T ′) < c(t, I) ≤ 12 + g, which implies g < 12 . Hence, the partition {I} is CS if g ≥ 12 .
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Further, interval T ′ = [0, p] can deviate if and only if ∆(t, T ′, {I}) < 0 for all t ∈ T ′. But
∆(t, T ′, {I}) = c(t, T ′)− c(t, I) =
{
Ψ(p)−Ψ(1), 0 ≤ t ≤ p2
Ψ(p)−Ψ(1) + (2t− p), p2 ≤ t ≤ p
is increasing on [0, p], hence, T = [0, p] can deviate if and only if ∆(p, T, {I}) < 0. Now
∆(p, T, {I}) = c(p, T ′)− c(p, I) =
(
p
2
+
g
p
)
−
(
1
2
− p+ g
)
= −
(
1
2
+ g
)
+
(
3
2
p+
g
p
)
.
For given g, this function is a convex in p, and attains its minimum at p∗ =
√
2g/3. Hence, an
interval [0, p] that can profitably deviate exists if and only if ∆(p∗, [0, p∗], {I}) < 0. Finally,
∆(p∗, [0, p∗], {I}) = −
(
1
2
+ g
)
+
(
3
2
p∗ +
g
p∗
)
=
√
6g −
(
1
2
+ g
)
.
Thus, P = {I} is not CS if and only if g > 1
2
and
√
6g − g − 1
2
< 0. That is,
√
g <
1
2 +
√
6
. 2
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